But belligerence isn't the same thing as wisdom -- and hawkishness does not always lead to a safer America. Lieberman has, of course, been the most vigorous Democratic defender of the Iraq quagmire, which has laid waste to U.S. defense capabilities in a way that not even Vietnam was able to....Indeed, Lieberman's judgment on defense questions is like that of a stopped clock: the hawkish position, applied consistently, has to be right sooner or later. What Lieberman is asking Connecticut -- and the Democratic Party, and the country -- to accept is that the only secure America is a bellicose America. And that position is a guarantee of future Iraqs.
The Washington establishment, with Lieberman as a surrogate, continues to perpetuate this idea that the only badge of national security seriousness is knee-jerk "hawkishness". But what does this mean? The bizarre idea that one should support every proposed war, always? It would seem so, if you take a look at what people like neocon Robert Kagan are saying.
One of the grand memes that has taken hold among lazy writers (and thinkers) is the hawk v. dove dichotomy. Implicit in these terms is the idea that "hawks" take national security seriously while "doves" don't. In practice, the idea is less than useless -- it's pernicious. The formulaton inverts priorities by neglecting what actually matters -- whether a policy choice is *effective* in furthering national security goals -- in favor of an undue emphasis on the machismo implicit in one's war stance. Wes Clark, who led the NATO campaign in Kosovo, is apparently a "dove" or "antiwar" because he opposed the Iraq War and had exceptionally good reasons to do so. Joe Lieberman, who's wrong about the Iraq War every step of the way, is a tough-on-defense hawk, according to the media narrative. Never mind Lieberman's position has actually made America weaker and less secure. All that matters is that Lieberman talks tough, at least he does if you can ignore the whiny, schoolmarmish timbre of his voice. But if you scrutinize his statements, he's as "unserious" as they come, a guy who can't get the first thing right in measuring and identifying current threats. But Lieberman's a symptom of a larger ailment. As Ackerman puts it: "If there's one myth that neocons have cultivated -- and the media have bought into -- since their post-Vietnam origins in the 1970s, it's that the greater danger to U.S. security comes not from disastrous wars but from overzealous opposition to disastrous wars."
The hawk/dove formulation leads to a strong bias in favor of war. But if the Iraq debacle tells us anything, it's that wars should not be entered into lightly, not only due to the sacrifices in blood and treasure, but because war dramatically increases the number of unpredictable or uncontrollable variables. We should always be skeptical of war. But we apparently haven't learned much. If Sy Hersh's new bombshell New Yorker piece is correct, the Lebanon incursion was vehemently supported by the U.S., especially by Dick "Mr. Fucktard" Cheney, as a warm-up for Iran. Predictably, the Israeli offensive did not go as well as expected and now the West needs a face-saving way for Israel to get out of there. Quelle surprise.
It would seem obvious that the war über alles mindset is not a sign of seriousness but of a feeble and weak mind. Shouldn't we go to war only when we must, and only when we can achieve our objectives by way of war? The War in Afghanistan was a shining example: it was just (we were attacked), there were discrete, achievable goals (destroy al Qaeda cells and remove the Taliban), and we had decent intelligence on the ground (aided by Pakistani intellegence). The Iraq War was just the opposite. Supporting both wars isn't the sign of seriousness or consistency or strength. To mix animal metaphors, the hawks, those who advocate war at the slightest provocation, are not unlike the donkeys in poker who will push all-in in any situation where they're uncertain. Yeah, the donk *might* take it down, but he will often go bust as well. Better poker players analyze all the information available before coming to a decision for all his chips. That would include the cards, the other player's tendencies, past play, what your opponent's likely hand (or range) is, what he thinks you have, what he thinks you think he has, etc. Shouldn't this be the approach to any important policy decision?
Remarkably, many writers, even smart, contrite hawks like Andrew Sullivan, are still inordinately obsessed with optics rather than efficacy. One long-standing Sully stance is his apparent insistence that the surest sign of national security seriousness is one's inclination to denounce our enemies with great gusto. So only someone who vocally express his hatred for Islamic terrorists or evil dictators is worth taking seriously.
"You hate Saddam? I hate Saddam more!"
"Oh yeah? I hate Saddam so much I'll send a bunch of poor kids to die to prove it!"
"Oh, yeah? Me, too!"
This is the sort of peurile thinking at the heart of "hawkish" calls for war. Most reasonable people can agree that Saddam is an evil dude. But I don't think going to war, absent other considerations, is a good way to express one' s moral indictment. I mean, we can all agree Stalin's a bad, evil dude. But we didn't freaking invade the Soviet Union just to prove our "moral resolve" either.
What's a good approach? I think Robert Wright's proposal for "progressive realism" is a great start, with weapons-monitoring and deterrence, image-building, and economic liberalization as the three pillars of our foreign policy. On the false machismo front, check out Glenn Greenwald's invaluable analysis of that most odious of species, the chickenhawk. When talking about chickenhawks, the idea isn't that only those with military experience can hold legitimate opinions about war and peace. Rather, "chickenhawk" is an apt description of the type -- usually an out-of-shape, overweight white guy suspiciously over-concerned with demonstrating "masculinity" (think Dick Cheney) -- who thumps for war as a first option. Being a warmonger is supposed to be a sign of personal strength in the chickenhawk world view, but it bears pointing out (again and again) that, when it comes to actual fighting, these wusses have their tails between their legs (think Dick Cheney and his five deferments). It's easy to call for war against any and all enemies when one's neck is conveniently not on the line.
